Too few precompetitive consortia are being formed to mitigate lost opportunities and deliver on other potential mutual gains for public and private stakeholders in drug development.
D
uring the past decade, many drug companies entered the race to independently develop a small molecule inhibitor of p38 kinase for inflammatory disease. All reached the same conclusion-the target is not viable owing to fundamental toxicity problems related to its biology. Tens of millions of dollars were invested and countless hours of effort were expended for researchers to come to this realization. Yet it all could have been so different. Collaboration around the target through a precompetitive consortium would have decreased the real expenditures and opportunity costs while retaining the option for each company to develop proprietary therapeutics, had the target shown promise. Here we argue that despite the formation of consortia as a complement to market competition and government regulation in recent years, too few exist to mitigate lost opportunities and deliver on other potential mutual gains for public and private stakeholders in the drug development enterprise.
What are consortia good for? Consortia and cooperative arrangements, particularly precompetitive arrangements that generate shared resources such as data, tools and analytics, can help advance the drug development enterprise as costs increase, R&D spending is cut back, regulatory requirements become more stringent, public trust in the industry declines and company valuations shrink 1 . At the core, too few new drugs and devices are making it to the market to alleviate the clinical need and to underwrite the spiraling costs of development. In fundamental ways, the processes, structures and cultures current in the industry are inadequate to meet the demands of biomedicine in the twenty-first century.
Shifting to a more sustainable drug development enterprise requires new models and methods for increasing efficiency and economy, decreasing and managing risk, stratifying patients and developing new tools and approaches 2 . Broadly speaking, there are five strategic avenues for industry innovation: (i) independent operation of each stakeholder (a form of competition); (ii) mergers and acquisitions (M&As; a different form of competition); (iii) strategic alliances (a cooperative model that is similar to but distinct from precompetitive consortia); (iv) open innovation approaches, such as crowdsourcing, prizes and challenges (another cooperative model that is similar to and distinct from precompetitive consortia), and (v) precompetitive consortia (comprising, for example, industry, government, academia and public, to develop and apply assessment tools and to analyze the resulting data. An iterative cycle of assessment and improvement can then be instituted, optimizing the return on the investment of time and resources.
The development of a consortium requires the identification of a shared need and the complementary resources to be contributed by the participants, as well as the establishment of working rules that govern the shared activity and its products. The time required to do this is a function of factors, such as the specificity and concreteness of the task, the similarities or differences that animate the participants and the value of the products. The process of getting the Biomarkers Consortium to launch took approximately two years of negotiations, which focused on bridging the divergent standards and practices of industry, government and academia with respect to, for example, intellectual property. Although each project needs a tailored IP agreement, underlying consortium-wide policies provide a common point of departure for such agreements.
Coming to agreement regarding how the financing and resources will be arranged and overseen may be difficult. Most consortia in biomedicine depend on professional staff (which requires central funding) and additional resources to be targeted for selected projects. Aligning incentives-financial and nonfinancial-is key and requires an understanding of the reward systems in place for each of the participants. Consortium structures must ensure that each party receives the necessary individual benefits while accomplishing collective objectives, or the consortium is doomed to fail. Poorly aligned incentives cause failures, as they do not provide sufficient impetus to engage partners and elicit the commitment of necessary funds as competing priorities, opportunities and needs arise.
Likewise, investment in a consortium usually represents a very small fraction of the costs of a drug development program. Because the vast majority of drug development efforts fail in an expensive waywhether early or late-and the failure of a consortium is relatively inexpensive, experimentation in consortium development may well be cost effective. Cost effectiveness, in this context, relates to the potential value of the consortium process and products versus the value of doing it alone. Embedded in this notion of consortium value is the deeper notion of the contrast between proprietary and precompetitive aspects of the drug development value chain. Collaboration, in the framework of a consortium or other partnership, implies that sharing resources, risks and products can be mutually beneficial. In patient or professional advocates). Consortia offer unique opportunities for stakeholders to redefine the precompetitive space, develop new work streams and jointly produce tools and resources.
The synergies resulting from the consortium approach promise to save time and money by more efficiently and effectively generating therapeutics, diagnostics and devices to improve the public health. Although any avenue for innovation has the potential to deliver cost savings, cooperative models increase the potential for risk sharing. The consortium model best fosters collaboration among stakeholders with diverse interests and experiences. Consortia, combined with the existing competitive institutional and regulatory arrangements, constitute a more robust institutional landscape for the entire drug development enterprise.
Specific and demonstrable successes from biomedical consortia include the Biomarkers Consortium, the Predictive Safety and Toxicology Consortium, the Patient Reported Outcomes Consortium, the Genetics Association Information Network and the National Bone Health Alliance. These models exemplify collaboration in areas where individual companies were already active. But consortia can also encourage innovation. One such example of a cross-industry collaboration is TransCelerate BioPharma, which was formed not only to allow industry participants to collaborate more efficiently with one another but also to promote interaction among an 'ecosystem' of participants, including the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), academia and patient advocates. Initial projects of this consortium include defining clinical data standards, developing common standards for investigator training and certification, creating a common portal for industry sponsored investigators and development of streamlined mechanisms to allow sponsors to obtain commercial comparator drugs for clinical trials 3 . This is not just an instance of precompetitive cooperation, but an explicit effort to better align the institutional context.
The success of precompetitive collaborations depends on a dynamic balance of cooperation, competition and regulation. At present, these cooperative aspects are underdeveloped, particularly in the United States. The use of this institutional arrangement is certainly more advanced in Europe. For example, the Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI) represents a commitment of more than €2 billion (US$2.7 billion) for multi-stakeholder collaboration. But this scale has been achieved through a structure in which industry has a strong role in driving the agenda-a setup that is helpful for generating industry contributions but likely to be biased toward drug development and qualification rather than discovery and basic science.
So if consortia have such potential for benefit, why is this type of innovation not sweeping the industry? Objections to consortia are many and include claims that consortia act as sinks for time and effort, are slow and burdensome and reveal the differences in worldview and priorities across sectors without solving those differences, and that historical norms of secrecy are insurmountable. With this in mind, in the following sections we assess the return on investment for consortia and attempt to identify which types of value this approach is most likely to achieve and at what cost.
The anatomy of consortia
The word 'consortium' , derived from the Latin for fellowship, invokes joint goals, the synergy of shared action and the notion of an underlying (negotiated) agreement. At its core, a consortium involves a new form of alignment among independent but interdependent stakeholders. More precisely, we define the stakeholder alignment needed for a consortium to succeed as the extent to which interdependent stakeholders orient and connect with one another to advance their separate and shared interests.
Consortia provide mechanisms for stakeholders to 'orient and connect' with one another, and they deliver on both 'separate and shared interests' . Furthermore, stakeholders can be aligned (or misaligned) along distinct dimensions. Alignment can be behavioral (information sharing, trust and so on), structural (forums, incentives and so on), strategic (strategic intent and realized strategies) or cultural (underlying values and assumptions). In considering consortia, we consider all these dimensions of stakeholder alignment 4 .
Despite their underlying similarities of purpose, consortia differ markedly in the details of membership, operating policies and practices and the fates expected of the products of their activities. Which behavioral and structural differences are responsible for whether a consortium accomplishes its goals is an important and insufficiently understood question.
The effective use of precompetitive consortia depends on a nuanced understanding of their behavior, structure, strategies and culture, as well as the availability of appropriate instruments and methods to monitor and evaluate them. Developing these takes time, though probably less than the usual 12-15 years needed to take a new compound to market. The time function, therefore, has two aspects: the time required to establish and operate a consortium to completion, and the time required
contrast with a joint venture or strategic alliance, a precompetitive consortium involves more open sharing, a risk that is balanced against the potential benefit of inputs from multiple stakeholders. At the other end of the cooperative spectrum, open innovation, such as crowdsourcing, involves more transparency and proportionally greater risk, counterbalanced by the potential for more diverse and unexpected inputs. In these senses, precompetitive consortia represent a middle path between risk and benefit.
Precompetitive sharing of tools and platforms can facilitate comparison across industry and academia, facilitate regulators' abilities to make data-driven assessments and clarify regulatory principles without impinging on the business model of big pharma 5 . Similarly, some argue that target sharing should also fall into the precompetitive space, allowing cost and risk sharing early in the development process without interfering with later-phase proprietary development of leads, as is currently done 6 . As noted above, p38 kinase target programs initiated by many companies hit a dead end that represented a massive loss of resources to biomedicine as a whole-in the direct costs as well as in opportunity costs from other, more viable programs not being pursued.
As demonstrated by the Biomarkers Consortium (see Box 1), however, managing expectations, understanding the real potential and limitations of consortia and carefully monitoring and evaluating progress and outcomes are key to understanding the place of consortia in the complex ecosystem of drug development. Ultimately, the fundamental question for all stakeholders in drug development is whether the continued, current independent patterns of interaction will be sufficient to sustain the enterprise in the future, or whether a rebalancing of competition and collaboration is needed.
Surmounting drug development's drawbacks
The inefficiencies and high attrition rates of current drug development are well known 7, 8 . These challenges arise on several levels.
Structural and strategic challenges. Not only is the overall process for drug development in crisis, but there is also ambiguity in the overall strategy. Niche drugs with stable but limited markets are often discarded in favor of potential blockbusters targeting common conditions. Focusing on disease entities rather than underlying pathobiological pathways dictates clinical trial designs that fail to account for heterogeneity among patients. The lack of biomarkers and other patient-stratification tools prevents optimization of trials to avoid toxicity and maximize efficacy. Regulatory decision making would be facilitated and improved by the availability of data and qualified tools 9 . The barriers arise from limitations in understanding of the biology, validated targets and adequate translational tools. Such understanding does not provide competitive advantages, and failing to share it creates major practical disadvantages.
Pooling of resources, data, tools and platforms-and sharing of the resulting productsoffers a way to streamline drug development. Consortium arrangements allow the harmonization of tools and markers developed through shared efforts and shared in a precompetitive manner, thereby providing new standards and regulatory benchmarks that are informed by science, technically validated and open for qualification for use. Consortia also offer the opportunity to explore new clinical trial approaches such as to focus efforts through adaptive designs, stratify patients according to risk or markers, test across disease boundaries according to implicated molecular pathways and/or interrogate data sets for new hypotheses and signals. Thus, consortia offer opportunities for resource leverage, precompetitive assay development, knowledge sharing, target validation and so on. Such sharing, in turn, enables and promotes competition by allowing more and higher-quality molecules to be developed by companies that will compete using these new drugs in the marketplace.
The paradox that precompetitive sharing promotes, rather than impedes, competition depends on carefully defining the crux of the competitive business model for the industry 10 . Pharmaceutical companies generate value and income through the development and marketing of medicines. Cost centers that siphon off resources reduce overall profits, and reductions in such costs improve the return to investors. Identifying cost centers that can be reduced by cost sharing provides value and increases return on investment.
Designing such cost-saving and risk-sharing arrangements depends on engaging the appropriate partners in consortia. From a structural standpoint, the drug development ecosystem can be said to comprise six major types of stakeholders: (i) pharma; (ii) biotech (mainly small and medium-sized companies (SMEs)); (iii) academia; (iv) government labs (such as the US National Institutes of Health (NIH)); (v) government regulators (such as the FDA), and (vi) patients, non-profit organizations and civil society. Each stakeholder is driven by distinct motives and incentives, answers to distinct authorities and has individual metrics for progress and success. Common to all, however, is the goal of improving health and well-being for patients. Major changes, at increasing pace, are occurring within each stakeholder community, and these changes increase instability in the ecosystem and provide pressure and opportunity for cross-sector collaborations. New forms of behavioral, structural and cultural alignment-in which adjustments are made by all stakeholders, taking into account their separate and shared interestswill be needed.
The dynamic structural landscape is characterized by M&As that have reduced the number of large pharma companies by nearly half. Furthermore, cutbacks in pharmaceutical R&D funding, dissolution of discovery groups and shuttering of facilities are common following M&As. Many small biotech companies have changed their business models, shifting from fully integrated pharmaceutical companies to simply targets for purchase by a larger company (preferably a pharmaceutical company) through advancing an area, target or molecule to the point where the larger organization can take it through the clinic (thereby substituting the smaller company for in-house R&D capabilities). Thus, new drugs originate increasingly, albeit inefficiently and unpredictably,
Box 1 Assessing the Biomarkers Consortium
After six years in operation, does the Biomarkers Consortium represent a good return on investment for its members? The consortium has launched 15 projects in areas such as Alzheimer's disease, cardiovascular disease and breast cancer, with several more projects now under consideration. The consortium's first project, 'The utility of adiponectin as a biomarker predictive of glycemic efficacy', was completed in 2009 (ref. 18); one other project has now been completed, and two more are slated for completion this year.
Through the consortium, industry has been able to constructively engage with the FDA on a precompetitive basis and understand the agency's thinking about biomarker qualification as a tool for drug development-opportunities that are useful for projects from the consortium as well as for other activities. At the same time, no qualified biomarker developed through the Biomarkers Consortium has yet delivered tangible results to patients or other stakeholders. Is this what must happen if continued engagement is to be expected in the consortium?
There are, of course, major cultural differences among and within companies, owing in part to the differences in nature between small, startup organizations and large, venerable, complex and isolated organizations with established ways of acting.
Of course, industry is not the only sector that is culturally diverse. Within government, cultural differences exist between the FDA, the NIH and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, as a result of the agencies' diverse missions as well as the training, experience and habits of the people working there 12 
Perhaps the deepest cultural challenge involves the lack of understanding in the general population of the risk that accompanies all therapies. Finally, important distinctions and deeply rooted cultural assumptions about health and disease are in the background of each sector and individual within the system.
Having drawn these broad characterizations, it is also clear that no sector or organization is monolithic; distinct (micro-) cultures exist within many or all companies, agencies and organizations. Aligning incentives, promoting effective and substantive communication and developing viable shared practices depends on a sensitivity to the cultural bases of behavior, expectations and willingness to assume risk or uncertainty.
A proposal for wider adoption of consortia We propose that, if cross-sector consortia are used judiciously, drug development writ large can more effectively promote the broad needs of patients and society, competition and the profit motive can drive innovation in the marketplace, regulation will enforce public health and safety standards, precompetitive collaboration will reduce waste and minimize risk, and collaborative approaches to science will open up new frontiers. Elements of this vision currently motivate the drug development enterprise at all levels. Missing, however, are mechanisms that align and orient the stakeholders so that it is possible for them to function together in a coherent and efficient system. Ad hoc approaches to drive change have been undertaken by subsets of stakeholders, including the NIH Roadmap, the FDA Critical Path Initiative and the European Commission's IMI. Academic and commercially sponsored conferences addressing crucial issues-such as the intersection of disease and wellness, the handling of 'small n' diseases, the boundary between in smaller enterprises. The lack of efficiency and predictability is manifest as an inadequate return on investment and provides justification for the reduction in R&D both within companies and after M&As. Academic stakeholders are also in a state of flux, with public universities facing funding crises and organizational challenges to facilitating interdisciplinary work. Traditional tenure and promotion criteria do not fully recognize the value of team science and of crossing departmental boundaries. Finally, government labs and regulatory authorities face the cross-currents of increasingly partisan politics and fundamental debates over the level and nature of government spending on many aspects of health.
Neither universities nor government is configured to develop, test and market medicines, and it is not clear that these activities are consistent with the mission of either. The academic mission to educate and to generate knowledge has important contributions to make to drug development, as do the scientific and regulatory missions of government agencies, but in neither case does that directly involve the business of medicines. Patient and public advocacy organizations and other mission-driven nonprofits are playing an important part in filling gaps not fully served by market forces, but this is an idiosyncratic process that depends on the emergence of leadership in a given disease area. Despite the emergence of venture philanthropy, patients are poorly represented in the drug development decision-making process overall. A further limiting factor is the availability of patients to enroll in clinical trials and to serve as a source of specimens and data. This is particularly true in circumstances where a disease often occurs with independent but co-morbid conditions, causing numerous exclusions from entry into clinical trials, and/or where patient populations are small.
The present misalignment of organizational or sector goals and incentives, however, constrains the ability of the ecosystem to accelerate the delivery of cost-effective solutions for health problems. These are the opportunities where consortia can make a difference.
Cultural challenges. Structural and strategic challenges that make alignment of parties and incentives difficult are also accompanied by deep cultural challenges 11 . Secrecy and privacy as operating principles are deeply ingrained in the pharmaceutical industry-is designed to protect market advantage by hiding the identity of targets of interest, clinic and therapeutic areas under investigation, and even sharing between preclinical and clinical teams within the company is unusual in many organizations.
Box 2 Elements of effective, multi-stakeholder consortia
Although there is no one-size-fits-all solution, several common elements are shared by successful and effective consortia. These are:
• Shared goals and vision. A clear statement of the consortium's goals and overall vision for success (including a shared understanding of what these words mean).
• Engaged stakeholders. A definition of a governance structure and rules for decisionmaking.
• Leadership and trust. Leaders able to be effective on the basis on influence, rather than authority, with trust among principals providing a necessary foundation as policies and norms develop.
• Roles, responsibilities and rights. Well-defined roles, responsibilities and rights for all participants-typically in the form of a charter, with monitoring, learning and conflictresolution mechanisms that enable necessary adjustments over time.
• Policies, protocols and standards. Well-articulated policies, protocols and standards governing the workings of the consortium and how the participants relate to one another (for example, in the areas of confidentiality, conflicts of interest, intellectual property, consortium grants and contracts, data access and data sharing, finances and flow of resources).
• Milestones and benchmarks. Benchmarking and communication processes to ensure that all parties-participants, stakeholders and beneficiaries, including regulators, clinicians, patient groups and advocates, the public, and so on-have an appropriate understanding of the risks and accomplishments.
• Exit and transformation plan. A built-in capacity for transformation, should fundamental changes in strategy, structure and process be necessary. An 'exit plan' should describe the conclusion of the consortium either when goals have been met or when it is determined that goals, milestones or benchmarks cannot be met.
C O M M E N TA R Y
npg the precompetitive and the competitive and the best processes for road mapping-have been mounted, but only by subsets of stakeholders. A skillful mix of collaboration, competition and regulation based on both lateral and crossdomain alignment of stakeholders can lead to the efficient and effective development of consortia, which, coupled with well-managed and reasonable expectations, could define the rightful place of this approach within the repertoire of drug development tools and approaches. Optimizing consortium structure and ensuring its 'goodness-of-fit' to the activities and goals of the consortium are crucial elements of success.
No single structure or set of terms is universally useful 13 . However, all successful and effective consortia, share the following components (see Box 2): (i) well-defined shared goals and objectives, (ii) well-specified governance and decision-making responsibilities, (iii) clearly articulated roles, responsibilities, contributions and returns of the partners, (iv) appropriate policies defining, for example, antitrust, publication and IP that are spelled out at the outset and adapted through experience, (v) leadership based on influence more than authority, and (vi) mechanisms for shared learning and continuous improvement. Further policies may also be needed and should be customized to the specific partnership or consortium. Finally, sufficiently specific and well-defined milestones and benchmarks permit concise understanding of a consortium's 'end points' and allow allocation of the correct amount of capital for a dedicated problem 14 . Once capital allocation and milestones are defined, risk is lowered and expectation of success is inherently more realistic. The advantages of consortia must therefore be understood from two distinct vantage points: that of strategy and that of realizing operational efficiencies.
Criticisms of consortia are generally based on the long time required for them to generate results, their excessive bureaucracy, the risks in sharing information, and specific regulatory barriers around certain forms of collaboration. But pooling resources has been shown to hasten the availability of data and tools, resulting in the availability of better biomarkers, improved clinical trial designs, expanded data sets and other advances. Likewise, the ability of regulators to access consensually validated and broadly available tools is valuable to facilitate effective regulatory decision making. The decision to develop a consortium rests on balancing the strategic and operational benefits to be gained the risks in time and resources and the likelihood of success. The goals and the operational structures developed to accomplish them can be translated into benchmarks and metrics. Monitoring the progress of the consortium toward its goals can also permit the timely dissolution of arrangements that are not succeeding, allow necessary course corrections and point to improvements in structure and/or functioning of the partnership.
The subject of when and how to use the consortium approach and how to assess its success is itself ripe for scientific investigation 15 . Such a 'science-of-science' approach is founded on underlying theory-based principles, including the notion of internal and lateral alignment of parties in negotiation with one another 16, 17 . Major pharma companies are complex and internally diverse organizations-as are government agencies and universities-and internal alignment and even internal communication can be very challenging and not culturally expected. Coordination within companies to determine when it is better to operate independently and when to work in partnership with others is relatively new. Some major pharmaceutical companies, such as Johnson and Johnson, now have internal forums in which company representatives involved in different consortia compare notes and develop coordinated strategies for engagement with consortia 14 .
The institutional arrangements associated with consortia are still in the early stages of development compared with the infrastructure associated with M&As. Consortia represent a contrast with the established systems for identifying and pursuing acquisition targets as a source of innovation. Consortia effectively round up all the potential buyers (pharma) of a technology and can give them access to the technology at 'bargain-basement' rates, with some development funding as the price of admission. The result is that what could be a market-driven, inter-company, competitive bidding process for a technology asset may become, through a consortium, a one-time sale to a pharma buyers' club spanning much of the market. A small company in a consortium risks having its IP accessed by all its potential customers but gains an inside track for visibility. And the risks of not participating may be worse-the consortium might fund an alternative route or breakthrough. It is possible that in the future, investors may even hold it against companies that are not in on the ground floor with consortia that are in an appropriate strategic space, just as they now will hold it against a firm (large or small) that is not managing the M&A space well.
Consortia are not yet well institutionalized across the industry or among other stakeholders. By virtue of their diverse membership, divergent underlying cultures and varying business structures and practices, they are dynamic arrangements requiring alignment within each stakeholder organization as well as among the stakeholder organizations themselves. When linear assumptions of cause and effect are applied to complex systems, the outcomes may be unanticipated, especially if little attention has been given to mechanisms for feedback and adjustment. Clear structures and policies for shared activities, as well as defined benchmarks and strategies for change, provide a framework for consortium success and for understanding the forces that govern that success.
Achieving lateral alignment (among stakeholders) is a process that may be quite unfamiliar to parties accustomed to working within hierarchical structures. Consortia are characterized by lateral and multi-layered relationships, requiring more influence and problem solving than authority and direction-skills that can vary considerably across consortium participants. Clarity in structure and shared vision regarding the goals and manner of interaction among the participants serve to provide common working rules and to promote sustained alignment across stakeholder groups, thereby increasing the ability of the consortium to accomplish its goals and to satisfy its participants. Maintaining consistent vision and goals, trust relationships and leadership can be challenging given the relatively high rate of personnel turnover or change of roles within industry, as well as in other stakeholder sectors.
Challenges of consortia
Better metrics and measurement are needed to assess whether biomedical consortia are progressing toward their goals and delivering value to their participants. Individual stakeholders will pull back if they do not see their interests advanced, yet if they are focused only on selfinterest, the consortium will not be sustainable. Thus consortia need to deliver on a mix of individual and collective interests among diverse stakeholders. Table 1 presents an initial schema of parameters and metrics that can assist in the monitoring of a consortium and help to provide guidance for course corrections and/or disbanding the consortium when goals are met or when it becomes apparent that they will not be met.
There are challenges apart from those of establishing the needed constituents, resources, structures and operations and of setting up the appropriate monitoring systems to ensure timely accomplishment of benchmarks, milestones and metrics, but they are not as easily quantified, assessed or rectified. Internal alignment within member organizations occurs outside of the view of the consortium but is crucial to the joint venture's success 13, 18 . It is important that
offer smaller enterprises a greater chance that their perspectives will be seen and valued by regulators and other leaders. Transparency and open sharing of information can markedly alter the usual licensing and sales process, either undermining or enhancing the ability of the SME seller to market itself and its product(s). Protecting the competitive edge and promoting sharing as a means to accomplish efficiencies of scale and synergies from bringing diverse resources together are counterbalanced, then, by the needs of academics to maintain their exclusive roles as experts, inventors and discoverers of knowledge; of SMEs to thrive in the market ecosystem (by bringing a product to market or by selling themselves as a product in the market); and of large corporations and SMEs to sustain a tenable business plan.
Concluding remarks
Factors challenging drug development, such as rising costs, increasing failure rates and regulatory uncertainty-set in a climate of global economic strain and increasing pressures on the costs of health care-are pushing the pharmaceutical industry to become leaner, more efficient and more effective in delivering members assign representatives who have sufficient gravitas within their own organizations and the authority to commit the organization to the consortium. These representatives face predictable dilemmas-they may be accused in their own organizations of having 'forgotten where they came from' and having 'gone native' while being accused in the consortium of not moving fast enough to ensure progress.
Trust among the members is key-particularly at pivotal moments in the life of the consortium, such as its formation-but difficult to force and measure. Without fundamental trust, commitment to persevere through points of disagreement and misaligned goals can be tentative or insufficient. Change in member personnel is an example of a pivotal event in the operation of a consortium with potential to undermine continuity, trust, efficiency and shared vision. Changes of personnel occur frequently in industry and other sectors, so this is a predictable challenge. Consortium policies and practices must be written to accommodate communication between leaders and members and among members as a means not only to exchange information but also to embody the commitment to sharing, trust, transparency and maintaining a common vision.
Precompetitive sharing should provide benefit to all of the participants and often to the public and nonparticipants as well. The motivation and ability of a stakeholder to join such an effort depends on several factors: whether consortium goals fall outside of or are tangential to the central business model or revenue center of the organization; whether the organization can tolerate devoting manpower, energy and possibly monetary and/or tangible resources to the effort; and whether the potential benefits of sharing exceed the risks. Of course, not all stakeholders can engage equally in precompetitive consortia.
Biomarkers, for instance, are precompetitive tools for the pharmaceutical industry, whose profit model centers around the registration and marketing of therapeutics. For a small biotech or device company, however, the discovery, development, qualification and marketing of biomarker tests is not precompetitive and may be the center of their financial model. Likewise, information sharing may prove much riskier for an SME with a limited portfolio of IP and know-how. On the other hand, consortia products to the public. The present system is not working. Among available options, precompetitive consortia, with defined goals and structures that align the incentives of all stakeholders, provide an option that can be strategic and low cost to individual stakeholders and can facilitate the delivery of shared tools and approaches to reduce both cost and risk. Ultimately, any system has four basic elements: inputs, processes, outputs and feedback. In the drug development ecosystem, there is substantial variability in all these elements. The building and examining of the role of consortia is an opportunity for a rebalancing of the competitive, collaborative and regulatory aspects of the system. Competition should be sustained in domains where it continues to drive innovation and serve society. In those where efforts are being duplicated, and resources are being wasted, precompetitive consortia and other mechanisms may produce better outcomes for the respective stakeholders and the system as whole. Consortia provide regulators and regulated parties more opportunities for mutual learning, which serves the overall public interest.
Consortia are just one tool to address systemic problems in biomedicine. Here, we have presented a proposal for how to increase the utilization and effectiveness of consortia. In fact, the biomedical enterprise will ultimately need to be realigned to achieve a more dynamic mix of competition, collaboration and regulation if it is to continue to deliver on the promise of improved societal health through the acceleration of change in science, technology and society.
